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Abstract: The paper introduces several issues that have one common target - secure
cooperation of autonomous information systems. We show that Active
authorization model may be an abstract layer that allows simple, efficient and
secure management of heterogeneous system's security properties.
1.  INTRODUCTION
Nowadays commercial sector demands possilibity to specify well-defined
tasks that represent usual business processes. It means that users may work
with intuitive tasks like process customer order or prepare contract of
insurance and so on.
The tasks' definitions may be divided into two abstract levels. The lower
level contains tasks representing atomic (relatively simple) actions. The
higher level comprises workflows, tasks that may be invoked by external
subjects (e.g. users) or other applications.
Commercial environment implies existence of users that can not be fully
trusted and will never be experts in security. Communication among
physically distant information systems is usually performed via insecure
channels and quality of access controls and used models differs. Those facts
demand existence of very tight security permissions that allow application of
need-to-know and need-to-do principles. Ideal seems to be authorization2 Daniel Cvrček
model that preservers and joins one security state with each particular task.
General properties of such a model have been given in [6].
2.  OVERVIEW OF SECURITY IN DISTRIBUTED
SYSTEMS
The first thing we have to do for solving security issues is to split the
distributed system into homogenous (from the security point of view) parts
that are centrally administered. We shall call them autonomous information
system or s-node.At this moment, we may solve secure cooperation among s-
nodes. The identified problems are:
a)  Access control in s-node - this problem comprises access control to
resources local in s-node and is solved by access control model
implemented in the local platform. Each autonomous system may have
implemented other access control model.
b)  Global administration of system - distributed system has to solve
problems with heterogeneity of its s-nodes and enforce uniform
administration of security properties.
c)  Flow control - we are talking about systems that allow space
distributivity of computational tasks. Those tasks use data with different
sensitivity, stored on many s-nodes. Flow control enforces uniformity
throughout the system - reference monitor [1].
We may control several different types of resource accesses (with
increasing abstraction).
1.  Access to resources on s-node
2.  Access to resources in workflow
3.  Access to workflows
4.  Data flow in workflows
It is clear that discretionaryon control is sufficient for the lowest level of
access control. The mandatory or some other type of axiomatic access
control (e.g. RBAC [2,3,4]) has to be on the other side used for access
control to workflows and their resources (e.g. RBAC) when a common
security policy is to be enforced.
3.  COOPERATION WITH ACCESS CONTROL
Cooperation between global authorization model (AAM) [5] see items
2-4 above and local authorization models (item 1) is the crucial aspect of
successful enforcement of access control rules throughout the distributed
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this cooperation. Existing papers explicitly use only RBAC model for
determination of subjects able to activate tasks.
We try to generalize cooperation between AAM and s-nodes' access
control systems. The basic condition is made by introducing general function
t t
I S P S 0 ) , ( → Φ  that allows determination of subjects - initiators, able to run
a task, from the set of all subjects according to the set of privileges necessary
for initialization of the task.
We do not say which way is the set obtained. We do not say what model
is used for that purpose. It may be a function that finds all users that are
specified in a given UNIX group or a function cooperating with RBAC
model that uses much more sophisticated ways for the purpose.
3.1  Examples of Local Access Control Models
There are vital differences among different access models. Because of the
lack of space we only name the most important. DAC models such as HRU,
Take-Grant, Acten. MAC models Bell-LaPadula, Biba or Dion and also
object oriented models ORION, Iris.
Generally, one may say that basic DAC (discretionary access control)
models do not offer any properties that can be used for generalization of
access control and there are problems with centralized administration. To
solve those problems we have to create layer isolating system with DAC
model from external subjects (users).
MAC (mandatory access control) models contain general axioms that
may be used for common security. Those axioms express certain general
rules that may be used for centralized administration.
The first problem that has to be solved is general architecture of
authorization system as a whole. We are interested in heterogeneous
distributed systems composed from s-nodes that are able to communicate
among themselves. Each s-node contains resources it is able to work with
(files, peripheral devices, ...). It also has a system that manages access to
resources (operational system, database management system) and there is an
access (or authorization) control model that is used for managing access to
resources. The control model has to be a part of authorization system.
3.2  Basic Layering of Authorization System
It is useful to create a basic layering of authorization system based on the
architecture of the distributed system.
We have already said that s-nodes contain (or use) access control model.
This is the first layer and we call it Local Access Control. This layer should4 Daniel Cvrček
be able to create new users or user groups and provide instruments that allow
authentication of more abstract systems (or its users).
Definition 1: Local Access Control Li is n-tuple Li={Si, Oi, Ai, fi} that
consists of set of users Si, set of resources (or objects) Oi set of access modes
Ai and authorization function fi that is defined as follows:
fi: Si ×  Oi ×  Ai →  {True, False}
The function fi is able to decide access requests. ■
The second layer of our architecture should be able to convert global
definition of privileges into a form applicable in Local Access Controls and
vice versa. This layer shall be called Conversion Layer. This is the first
element that creates some general (global) framework.
Definition 2: Conversion Layer represents two functions 
r
i σ  and 
u
i σ  that
take set of users and set of resources from the underlying Local Access
Control Li=(Si, Oi, Ai, fi), set of resource categories C
k and returns subset of
users that are authorized to access specified resources.
i i
k u
i S S C → × : σ
uses 
r
i σ  to translate resource categories C
k into the set of resources 
k
i O
k
i
k r
i O C → : σ
and of course the function fi to determine the final subset of users with
privileges to access all elements from the set of resources 
k
i O .  ■
Next layer should allow specification of tasks executable in the
distributed system. We distinguish two types of tasks.
–  Tasks that are executed on one s-node and by one user. We call those
tasks atomic tasks. The description of those tasks is dependent on the
particular s-node.
–  Tasks that may be executed on several s-nodes and/or by several users.
We call them workflows and their specification is platform independent.
Atomic tasks are described by means of given s-node. Particular layer is
Atomic Task Manager. The last one, Workflow Manager is completely s-
node independent. It allows its implementation by means satisfying
execution on various systems. Workflow Manager may be split into two
parts, one concerning static authorizations of workflows (authorizations that
are specified during workflow creation) and one concerning dynamic
authorizations.
3.3  Communication of Security Layers
Authorization system of any distributed system has to be active. We do
not know all users of the distributed system in one central place and s-nodes
have to be able to determine whether and where are users able to run
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How to perform a workflow? Imagine that someone on s-node Si has
started a workflow and executed the first step of it. We need to find all s-
nodes that are potentially able to execute next step of the workflow.
(1) We have to address all s-nodes in the distributed system. (2) Each s-
node identifies users that are able to continue the workflow and wait until
one of the identified users initiates execution of the task. (3) When the active
user is on the s-node Sj, then Sj responds to Si. (4) S-node Si recalls its
request on all s-nodes except Sj. And (5) execution of the workflow moves to
the new s-node Sj and the active user may execute next step.
The most important is step (2). Communication among layers of the
authorization system on particular s-nodes is performed here. The Workflow
Manager receives the first impulse. It has to ask the Atomic Task Manager,
if the particular task is defined there. In the case of success, the Atomic Task
Manager has to determine set of users authorized (static rights) to run the
task (either directly with Local Access Control or in cooperation with
Conversion Layer). The same task but with the dynamic authorization is
done by Workflow Manager, Conversion Layer and Local Access Control.
There are received two sets of users. Their intersection is a set of users
authorized to execute the workflow's task.
3.4  The Conversion Layer
Conversion Layer is the place, where two considerably different models
are in touch. Very important is to find criterion for general specification of
authorization requirements. The following possibilities were identified.
–  Hierarchy in the organization.
–  Name of subject (user).
–  Privilege for data access (analogy with MAC).
–  Reference to a common hierarchy (absolute or relative (from-to)).
–  Reference to another predefined role (group) structure.
–  Types of resources that have to be accessed.
The classification we shall use has to be very stable and must be applicable
for all s-nodes. We have assumed that the most general and stable
classification should be based on resource categories (defined according to
data content) that form a non-hierarchical set of elements C
k that depends on
the environment.
When using just category of resource, subject is able to perform all
possible operations over accesible resources. We have got no information to
restrict set of operations. The restriction in this direction is enforced through
the tasks' definitions.6 Daniel Cvrček
Resource categorization is the fixed point that allows global definition of
workflows. All task definitions use categorization (or classification) to
specify security requirements for data access (resources and workflows).
During execution of particular task step are categories converted into form
that the s-node's Local Access System is able to use to determine authorized
users and to determine needed resources (functions Φ  and Θ ). Atomic Task
Manager performs this conversion especially in Conversion Layer and
partially.
4.  CONCLUSION
We have proposed base ideas of the problem of unification of security
administration and secure cooperation among autonomous information
systems. The offered approach consists of two cornerstones. The first one is
existence of uniform security classification (or categorization) of resources.
This fact constitutes fixed point that consolidates security administration of
s-nodes. The second one is design of authorization system in such a way that
allows separation of particular platforms from active subjects (especially
users). This structure allows uniform definition of workflows on any s-node
in the distributed system.
The result is the architecture of authorization system that allows secure
execution of workflows, centralized administration of the whole distributed
system and decentralized definition of workflows.
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